Research for Continuation Behavior

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May 1, 2006
In 2005, the Navy implemented changes to the Selected Reserve incentive program. The likely retention effects of these changes are not known, so we estimate the retention effect of enlistment and reenlistment bonuses to help the Navy determine the most efficient allocation of Selected Reserve Bonuses. In a companion document, CRM D0013385, we provide a discussion of how those parameters were estimated, our main findings, and the policy implications of our findings. In this memorandum, we list the full regression results.
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April 1, 2006
In 2005, the Navy implemented changes to the Selected Reserve incentive program. The likely retention effects of these changes are not known, so we estimate the retention effect of enlistment and reenlistment bonuses to help the Navy determine the most efficient allocation of Selected Reserve Bonuses. Reenlistment bonus eligibility increases reenlistment rates and the share of Sailors who decide to obligate for at least a 6-year reenlistment contract. Thus, reenlistment bonus eligibility can be used to target personnel to reenlist and obligate for longer contracts. Receiving a reenlistment bonus does not significantly influence the decision to stay in the Selected Reserves; however, continuation rates among bonus recipients and nonrecipients are relatively high. Consequently, if the Navy is considering lump sum payments, we recommend it first be piloted to reenlistment bonuses. Targeted enlistment bonuses can be used to improve Selected Reserve continuation rates. For prior-service and non-prior-service enlistments, receiving a bonus increases the likelihood of completing the first 12 or 24 months of service. Further, the continuation rates of non-prior-service entrants who did not receive a bonus were similar to the rates of prior-service entrants, suggesting that an increase in the pool of non-prior-service accessions would not decrease overall manning levels.
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March 1, 2003
Abstract:D7675 The Navy finished FY02 above planned endstrength because of higher than anticipated retention. Despite cuts in the FY03 accession goal, there are concerns that the Navy might continue to be above planned strength. At the same time, there is a concern that additional cuts in accessions would leave the Navy with long-term manning problems. Therefore, this study examines the Navy's steady-state, non-prior-service accession requirements to see if further cuts would result in a cohort that is too severely undersized. We estimate a range of requirements using FY01 and FY00 retention, but incorporate recent improvements in first-term attrition, likely changes in economic conditions, and future changes in advancement opportunities. We estimate a range of non-prior-service accession requirements of 42,300-46,000; this implies a total steady-state accession requirement of 45,000-48,700. If steady-state requirements are at the lower end of this range, current conditions do support a temporary cut in accessions. Cutting accessions carries some risk, however; if requirements are closer to the upper end of our estimates, the current first-term cohort is appropriately sized. It is imperative, therefore, that the Navy carefully monitor the retention of any undersized cohorts and be committed to protecting retention with reenlistment incentives.
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