Research for Competition

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December 1, 2001
Over the past several years, the military has faced mounting recruiting, reenlistment, and manning difficulties. One perceived reason for these difficulties is increased competition for skilled personnel from the private sector, particularly through its incentive pay and benefit offerings. Although the recent softening of the economy may help to ease some of these competitive pressures, other less cyclical trends -such as a smaller high-school graduate recruiting pool and lower propensity to enlist in the military-persist. These trends suggest that a careful survey of the private-sector incentive pay and benefits landscape is needed. In this paper, we compare and contrast the incentive pay and benefit offerings of large, private-sector firms to those of the military. In doing so, we assess whether these offerings differ significantly in their provision, scope, or structure. We also consider whether these offerings have played a role in the military's recent recruiting, reenlistment, and manning difficulties. Finally, we describe the offerings of several private-sector companies that are likely to compete with the military for skilled personnel. We find significant differences in military and private-sector incentive pay and benefit provision of incentive-based pay, health care and retirement benefits, education and training services, child care, workforce flexibility measures, and Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR)/other quality-of-life programs. In most cases, military benefits are broader in scope, differ in structure, and involve less choice than those offered by the private-sector. Taken together, these trends suggest several recommendations that could help the military in its recruiting, retention, and manning efforts.
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September 1, 2001
The purpose of this study is to review the realism, and sustainability of estimated savings under the competitive sourcing program and examine whether the expected level of savings can be achieved and maintained over the long run without affecting the quality of services provided. To look at these cost and performance issues, CNA examined 16 competitions completed between 1988 and 1996. For the 16 competitions included in our analysis, we collected actual costs and all available performance information from the time of competition through FY 1999. We calculated the expected level of savings for each competition (based on the difference between the pre-competition costs and the winning bid) and compared these savings estimates with the post-competition costs.
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January 1, 2001
As the longest economic expansion in history continues, the competition between the private sector and the military for able personnel intensifies. This competition has prompted renewed interest in the benefit and incentive pay programs that large, private-sector firms offer. As part of the Navy's FY 2000 Manpower and Personnel Integrated Warfare Architecture (IWAR), the Director of the Assessment Division (N81) has asked CNA to examine the provision of various benefit and incentive pay programs in the civilian sector. Of particular interest is the provision of such programs among large, private-sector firms that are considered strong competition in the market for skilled labor. This annotated briefing provides some context for the discussion by describing the current recruiting and retention difficulties of both the military and large, private-sector firms, and explains our choice of research methodology for assessing benefit and incentive programs currently offered to workers in large, private-sector firms.
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August 1, 2000
In June 1999, the Navy's Five Year Development Plan included roughly 80,000 civilian positions as part of its "competitive sourcing initiative." As a result of competitive sourcing, half or more of the positions involved with commercial activities (Navy activities that are similar to activities in industry) could be removed from the civil service roles either because of outsourcing or internal efficiencies. Because the competitions were planned for the most part, as isolated actions, the broader consequences of these competitions for the overall civil service workforce were not fully understood. For this reason, the Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (N1B) asked CNA to develop some guidelines that would help decision-makers plan for the consequences of the Navy's competitive sourcing initiative. Specifically, the request was to (a) establish a baseline of the current and past civil service workforce, and project changes that could result from the competitive sourcing initiative; (b) benchmark the Navy system and its
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June 1, 1998
This study examines potential manpower costs of outsourcing Navy jobs that result from more Sailors having to work out-of-skill. To examine these costs, we estimated the effects on retention and advancement of working in billets related to one's skill and in instructor billets. Focusing on E5 and E6 billets, we then compare the quantifiable costs of outsourcing military billets to the expected savings. Currently, 49.6 percent of E5 and E6 Sailors are assigned to rating-specific NECs on their shore tours. The analysis finds that if more than 49.6 percent of the outsourced billets are rating-specific, there would be fewer opportunities to work in-skill and lower retention, which would lead to costs to offset. We recommend that, when determining what billets to compete, the Navy start with general skill billets and other out-of-skill billets. Furthermore, if the Navy were to compete in-skill billets, we recommend that it compete low-training billets before high-training and instructor billets.
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June 1, 1998
The purpose of this study is to help the Navy identify the costs imposed on the Navy manpower system when military billets are outsourced. In particular, this paper examines how competition will affect the Navy's ability to achieve its objectives with respect to sea-shore rotation and homebasing. It provides, by community, estimates of how different outsourcing options would affect these military manpower decisions. The paper concludes that personnel policy constraints, especially the goal of providing an adequate base of shore billets for rotation, place significant limits on the number of military billets entered into A-76 competitions. Given the magnitude of manpower constraints, the Navy has two policy options: reduce the number of military billets to be competed or loosen the number of constraints. Loosening the constraints would involve: more carefully defining sea/shore ratios, allowing some A-76 competitions with high expected savings to be completed even if exceptions must be made to personnel policy goals, examining overseas shore billets that count as sea duty as good outsourcing candidates, and reexamining some of the IBR exclusions, especially for shore-intensive ratings. DTIC AD-B239314
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January 1, 1998
In a previous study, CNA analysts used data from past DoD A-76 competitions to construct a model of savings and projected the potential savings from additional DoD Commercial Activities (CA) competitions. In this paper, we use an alternative approach for estimating savings from future Dod CA competitions. We estimate two separate bidding equations - one for the in-house team bid and another for the minimum contractor bids - along with an equation for baseline cost. Based on these estimated equations, one could then indirectly project future savings in the A-76 inventory as the difference between predicted baseline cost and the predicted winning bid. Using the new approach, we project an annual savings of $6 billion if the entire 1995 DoD CA inventory were competed under A-76 rules.
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December 1, 1997
Given the lack of an immediate threat by a superpower, the pressures to fund nondefense programs, and the desire to shrink the deficit, the military's budget, in real terms, is unlikely to increase. Yet, we must fund modernization efforts and new initiatives, such as 'the Revolution in Military Affairs.' The only source for these funds appears to be the current military infrastructure accounts. Therefore, this paper calls for a 'Revolution in Business Affairs' (RBA) to provide an efficient and flexible infrastructure that supports changing military requirements at a price that does not overwhelm modernization efforts. The RBA will achieve this by changing fundamental DoD business process to those that have worked in the private sector.
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July 1, 1997
Despite shrinking budgets, the U.S. military is struggling to simultaneously fund force levels, current operations, and an aggressive modernization program. Many believe the military can fund its recapitalization program if cost efficiencies can be achieved from within infrastructure budgets. One way to reduce infrastructure costs is through competition, outsourcing, and privatization. Whether the in-house (or organic) team or the private team wins the contract, the government benefits because the competition lowers costs and increases productivity. This paper examines the maintenance of the Navy's TA-4Js. The value of this analysis is that it allows us to look at a long series of performance and cost data, both for in-house and contractor maintenance. Because we have data on three contractors, we can also examine the effect of changing contractors.
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May 1, 1997
CNA prepared this briefing for the Department of the Navy's Rightsourcing Process Action Team, under the auspices of the Total Ownership Cost Goal Management Board of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development, and Acquisition) (ASN(RD&A)). In this briefing, we review the background of the study and our approach, identify those companies and activities that participated in our study, summarize the factors that we found affect rightsourcing decisions, and describe our key findings.
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