Research for Coalition Forces

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The Intervasion of Haiti
August 1, 1996
On 19 September 1994, U.S. troops began a permissive entry into Haiti. This occurred the morning after President Clinton stopped an invasion with airborne forces already in the air. Perhaps most appropriately called an intervasion, somewhere between an invasion and intervention, Operation Uphold Democracy came almost exactly three years after the Haitian armed forces overthrew the government of Jean Bertrand Aristide, the first democratically-elected president in Haiti's turbulent history. The 1991 coup and the use of military forces to restore President Aristide fit into a long-term pattern of Haitian political instability and violence. The United States led the international intervention (intervasion) to restore the democratically elected President to power. This paper reviews Haitian-American relations and events in Haiti leading to the operation, discusses the operation through its three phases, evaluated the intervention, and describes some potential lessons to be learned from it. Table 2 provides a list of US Operations in the Caribbean, 1991-1995.
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Emerald Express 95 Analyses Report
April 1, 1996
The purpose of Emerald Express was to bring together senior representatives from military, relief, political, and diplomatic communities to address issues that arise during Humanitarian Assistance and Peace Operations (HA/POs). In this paper, we describe the analysis resulting from Emerald Express '95 (EE95). CNA supported EE95 by providing a series of read-ahead summaries on issues such as coalition operations, mission statement development, and coordination between the military and humanitarian relief organizations. CNA also provided annotated briefings based on early findings of the HAO study team at the time of Emerald Express. This material was intended to raise issues for discussion. During the exercise itself, CNA analysts participated in and observed the working groups.
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Development of U.S. Joint and Amphibious Doctrine, 1898-1945
September 1, 1994

The Naval Doctrine Command asked the Center for Naval Analyses to examine the command and control doctrine and practice of U.S. naval forces. The purpose of this effort is to help the Command (1) refine naval doctrine and (2) participate more effectively in the development of joint doctrine. CNA's Naval Command and Control for Joint Operations project examines how current Composite Warfare Commander (CWC) and Amphibious Warfare concepts can better integrate with the command and control of joint and combined operations. One of the objectives of this study is to understand how the dynamics that drive command and control for joint and combined operations differ from those that drive the Navy's use of the CWC structure. To do this, we need to examine the following questions: (1) How did our current joint and combined command structures evolve? (2) Why did these structures take the forms that they have? and (3) What are the implications for naval forces? This research memorandum focuses on the origins and evolution of U.S. doctrine for joint, combined, and amphibious warfare. First, we discuss how doctrine developed from the initial U.S. experience at modern coalition warfare in World War I, and then through the development of techniques and doctrine for operations between the wars. Second, we examine how current doctrine arose out of World War II. Finally, we discuss some of the implications for today's naval forces.

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Multinational Naval Cooperation in a Changing World: A Report on the Greenwich Conference 12-13 December 1991
October 1, 1992
In December 1991, an international conference was convened at the Royal Naval College in Greenwich, England, to explore the roles of maritime forces and multinational naval cooperation in our rapidly changing world. This report synthesizes the discussions at the conference and the papers that were presented to stimulate discussion. Its organization is based on four themes: (1) Multinational naval cooperation may be more a necessity than a luxury in an era of shrinking force structures and a declining and differentiated threat environment; (2) Although traditional areas will not be neglected, cooperation in the emerging international environment will include more 'maritime' missions than in the previous heavily military naval orientations. The result should be a greater balance among these mission areas; (3) The patterns of multinational naval cooperation will vary across regions, depending on the purpose, experience, and capabilities of participants and, more broadly, on the pattern of regional political-military relationships; and (4) The role of the United Nations in multinational naval cooperation is growing, but will remain largely limited to endorsement over the near term. UN conduct of operations will develop later, if at all, on a case-by-case basis.
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