During the course of the project, Sino–Japanese relations have improved, although the rivalry is, if anything, intensifying. When the project was first conceived in early 2006, relations were close to an all-time low. Japan’s Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro refused to yield to pressure from China and the Republic of Korea to stop visiting the Yasukuni Shrine and demonstrate a “proper appreciation for Japan’s history.” At the same time, Japanese officials were furious with Beijing for tolerating anti-Japanese riots in March and April 2005, and for having orchestrated a sustained effort to thwart Tokyo’s attempt to gain a permanent UN Security Council seat. In Beijing, policy initiatives to improve relations with Tokyo ground to a standstill after President Hu Jintao failed in his personal attempt to persuade Koizumi to be more responsive on the “history” issue.
In June 2008, in Shanghai, CNA China Studies held a joint conference with the Center for American Studies, Fudan University, on the current status and future prospects of the U.S.-China bilateral economic relationship. Conferees included academics, policy-makers, and practitioners from both the U.S. and China. Report captures six key themes discussed at the conference, including the increasing complexity of the bilateral economic relationship; the role that public perception in both countries plays in shaping the relationship; the misunderstandings that each country has of the other’s intentions; ongoing debates about the bilateral trade imbalance and revaluation of the Chinese renminbi; the purpose and prospects of the Strategic Economic Dialogue (SED); and the importance of clarifying both countries’ economic priorities and goals.