Research for Arms Control

This paper tries to identify significant current trends that may continue into the 21st century and shape Soviet military strategy. An arms control trend, stemming from the Soviet concept of 'reasonable sufficiency,' seems slated to handicap the USSR severely in options for fighting and winning large-scale conventional and theater-nuclear wars. Moscow evidently feels the strategic nuclear sphere will be the key arena of military competition in the future. The USSR now shows a greater commitment to offensive counterforce than was true of the period before 'reasonable sufficiency.' Moscow's interest in the strategic nuclear sphere will be reinforced in the future by a long-term trend toward space warfare. However, it may be possible to soften the competition in this sphere through arms control. Prominent Soviets have already begun to suggest that, if the U.S. will limit its Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) ambitions to a 'thin' defense, Moscow might actually prefer mutual comprehensive Antiballistic Missile (ABM) deployments to continued adherence to the 1972 ABM Treaty.

Throughout the last decade, the Soviet politico-military leadership has provided startling evidence of a new Soviet doctrine on nuclear and conventional wars. According to Soviet military writers, the changes in doctrine that constitute the new revolution in Soviet military affairs were generated by evolving technological developments in both nuclear and conventional arms. This paper provides evidence from Soviet military literature that changes in strategy, operational art, and tactics have in turn generated changes in force structure and weapons modernization that indicate a downgrading of nuclear contingencies and a preference for conventional warfare.

This paper discusses Soviet political responses to TRIDENT and the TOMAHAWK nuclear land-attack missile. Soviet strategy in arms control is reviewed and attention placed on linkage of U.S. strategic offensive forces to the Strategic Defense Initiative. Possible Soviet responses to U.S. proposals are explored.

The development of nuclear weapons created a watershed in the history of military strategy. Heretofore, the ability to deter war had depended on the ability to defend oneself against attack and to defeat an aggressor. As nuclear weapons became increasingly powerful, and their means of delivery more unstopable, this relationship was shattered. This paper explores the development of nuclear deterrence from both the U.S. and Soviet perspectives, and discusses the effect of strategic defense on arms control.