Research for Amphibious Warfare

The Naval Doctrine Command asked the Center for Naval Analyses to examine the command and control doctrine and practice of U.S. naval forces. The purpose of this effort is to help the Command (1) refine naval doctrine and (2) participate more effectively in the development of joint doctrine. CNA's Naval Command and Control for Joint Operations project examines how current Composite Warfare Commander (CWC) and Amphibious Warfare concepts can better integrate with the command and control of joint and combined operations. One of the objectives of this study is to understand how the dynamics that drive command and control for joint and combined operations differ from those that drive the Navy's use of the CWC structure. To do this, we need to examine the following questions: (1) How did our current joint and combined command structures evolve? (2) Why did these structures take the forms that they have? and (3) What are the implications for naval forces? This research memorandum focuses on the origins and evolution of U.S. doctrine for joint, combined, and amphibious warfare. First, we discuss how doctrine developed from the initial U.S. experience at modern coalition warfare in World War I, and then through the development of techniques and doctrine for operations between the wars. Second, we examine how current doctrine arose out of World War II. Finally, we discuss some of the implications for today's naval forces.

This paper argues that with appropriate changes in fleet operations and deployment that a Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) could be as responsive to an attack on Europe as airlifted Army forces.