Research for Allies
January 1, 2002
CNAC and its Russian counterpart, ISKRAN, held their 15th seminar here at CNAC on 7 December 2001. This is a report of that seminar. The report is also based on other discussions the Russian visitors had in the Washington area, including with Deputy Secretary of State Armitage and Vice Admiral Keating, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy and Operations. The CNAC program dates back to the fall of 1990, when we invited Andrey Kokoshin, among others, to the CNAC Annual Conference, to the fall of 1991, when a CNAC group took its first trip to Moscow, and the spring of 1992, when the first CNAC-ISKRAN seminar was held, here in Washington. The discussions focused on new opportunities for Russian American relations and for NATO-Russian cooperation following September 11, following President Putin's initiative to support the United States on September 24, and following the Bush-Putin summit meeting in November ("the Crawford Summit"). These discussions stood in some contrast to the discussions we held in Moscow in July 2001. Then there was an almost complete obsession among our Russian interlocutors, with the impending demise of the ABM treaty, and with it, as they said, the end of strategic stability. There was also a discussion during the seminar on whether the last decade had seen a great deal of progress in the improvement of U.S.-Russian relations or was a time of wasted opportunities during which the chances for a real Russian-American partnership, especially in matters of security, were squandered.
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October 1, 1993
The Navy, like any military organization, exists to employ force in the service of national policy--in short, to wage war. Peacetime operations have influence precisely because they carry with them a constant reminder of the ability of the Navy and the nation to use force to compel or protect. The Navy must not neglect its warfighting heritage. But the demands of the post-Cold War world require greater attention to the use of the Navy to influence other nations in conditions short of war or crisis. As we enter the twenty-first century, the Navy must accept new responsibilities to keep our friends friendly, to keep our adversaries deterred and quiescent, to draw uncommitted states closer to the United States, and to either restore stability to unstable regimes or mitigate the consequences of instability. Despite its reputation as a conservative organization, one of the great strengths of the Navy is its ability to adapt. It adapted to the dominance of the carrier in 1942. It adapted to the needs of inshore warfare in Vietnam. It adapted to the challenge of a seagoing Soviet superpower in the final decades of the Cold War. Now it must adapt to the need to use the tools of war to gain peacetime influence in an uncertain age.
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October 1, 1992
In December 1991, an international conference was convened at the Royal Naval College in Greenwich, England, to explore the roles of maritime forces and multinational naval cooperation in our rapidly changing world. This report synthesizes the discussions at the conference and the papers that were presented to stimulate discussion. Its organization is based on four themes: (1) Multinational naval cooperation may be more a necessity than a luxury in an era of shrinking force structures and a declining and differentiated threat environment; (2) Although traditional areas will not be neglected, cooperation in the emerging international environment will include more 'maritime' missions than in the previous heavily military naval orientations. The result should be a greater balance among these mission areas; (3) The patterns of multinational naval cooperation will vary across regions, depending on the purpose, experience, and capabilities of participants and, more broadly, on the pattern of regional political-military relationships; and (4) The role of the United Nations in multinational naval cooperation is growing, but will remain largely limited to endorsement over the near term. UN conduct of operations will develop later, if at all, on a case-by-case basis.
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May 1, 1992
The Unite States is entering a momentous period in its history. The Cold War is over. The threat of world war III has dissipated along with the USSR and its communist part. The post-Cold War world is taking shape, with profound changes affecting both international and domestic politics. First, there appears to be a profound shift from geopolitics and military threat to geoeconomics as the basis for this new order. Second, the rebuilding of economic and social structures at home has assumed greater importance as a legitimate national security imperative. Given the strength, resilience, and leadership of the United States, it would appear that the end of the Cold War should redound to America s distinct advantage. The Center for Naval Analyses is using this year's annual conference as a forum to debate how these changes will affect America's national security policy and its maritime component in the post-Cold War world.
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October 1, 1991
This volume of the Desert Storm Reconstruction Report documents the maritime interception force operations that were used to enforce the United Nations Security Council's economic sanctions against Iraq. The operations described include those occurring from the beginning of Desert Shield in August through the cease-fire at the end of February.
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October 1, 1991
This volume of the Desert Storm Reconstruction Report addresses the mission and roles of Mine Countermeasures (MCM) forces in support of the coalition defense of Saudi Arabia and efforts to drive Iraqi forces from Kuwait. It discusses the mine threat, antidrifting-mine operations in the Persian Gulf, and MCM operations against moored and bottom mines in support of naval gunfire support and amphibious operations.
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April 1, 1991
This research memorandum explores the political effects of U.S. military presence in the Asian-Pacific region. It proposes a framework that outlines the goals of presence and the process through which political effects develop. It then uses this conceptual framework to examine the political effects of presence in the region. This paper surveys U.S. policy objectives in the future security environment in Asia and explores the direct contribution of presence to U.S. policy objectives and the indirect support it gives through bolstering stability. Finally, it notes some implications of the analysis for future U.S. force options in the region. See also 96 005100, 96 005200, and 55 000506.
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April 1, 1986
The Center for Naval Analyses has been examining current issues and future prospects in the Western Alliance since June 1984. The aim is to better inform U.S. Navy policy initiatives and long-range planning for the European theater, by helping to define the planning environments, opportunities, and limitations the Navy may have to face in the decade ahead. While affairs of Alliance are of prominent interest, the examination has not been confined to NATO per se. On the theory that politics among nations begin with politics and related developments within nations, the study has also considered influences on, and frames of reference for, the evolution of national defense policies in individual Alliance member countries. This research memorandum, part of a series of CNA papers on future directions of the Western Alliance, is concerned with these national policies. This particular report looks at six European allies in terms of their own defense aspirations, domestic constraints, and policy choices in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The focus is on those key factors most likely to influence the security priorities and postures of each of the six. The six are France, Britain, Germany, Italy, Greece, and Spain.
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April 1, 1954
Examination of the War Diary of the German Communication Submarines (ComSubs) has made it possible to estimate the character and extent of intelligence obtained by the decryption of Allied radio messages pertaining to convoy operations in the North Atlantic during World War II, and to determine the effect of such intelligence on the capability of the U-Boats to contact convoys and sink ships. It is estimated that the availability of timely usable decryption intelligence increased the contact rate twofold over that which they would have obtained without it; probably over 60 sinkings in excess of the expected number if they had been deprived of decryption intelligence. These calculations help in estimating a valid measure of effectiveness of current and future submarines in anti-convoy operations when decryption intelligence is not available.
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