Research for ACOL

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March 1, 2002
An understanding of the relationship between changes in compensation and changes in reenlistment behavior is crucial to shaping the force. A common measure of this relationship is the pay elasticity of reenlistment, the percentage change in reenlistment associated with a 1-percent increase in pay. The literature on Navy enlisted personnel has produced widely varying estimates of this relationship; with changes in both analytic approach and in the Sailors being studied, the reasons for these differences are unclear. Our analysis suggests that most of the variation in these estimates can be explained by the use of different analytic models. Different specifications yield different estimates that span the range found in previous research. Because each specification uses the same data, these different estimates reflect differences in the degree to which these models attribute differences to pay, not differences in the behavior of enlisted personnel. In contrast, there is little variation in the pay elasticity over time; the only significant changes occur during the drawdown. We choose a preferred specification by examining its ability to accurately predict reenlistment behavior. For both in-sample and out-of-sample predictions of reenlistment, our baseline model, with a pay elasticity of 1.5, provides the best fit of the data.
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November 1, 2001
This survey represents a survey of enlisted retention models and findings. It includes discussion of: the Annualized Cost of Leaving (ACOL) model; panel prohibit models; conditional logit models; multinomial logit models; reverse causation between bonuses and the reenlistment rate; joint models of attrition and retention; elasticity computation; elasticity estimates; estimation of discount rates; and, effects of variables other than pay.
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September 1, 1986
Summarizes the work and finding of the Enlisted Manpower, Personnel and Training study conducted by a team of analysts at the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA). The study examined ways the Navy can most cost effectively attract and retain the enlisted personnel it needs when it is growing and when faced by stronger competition from the civilian sector and other services. Detailed descriptions of the analysis have been published in a series of CNA publications; this report summarizes those works and highlights the main findings relevant to the Navy's manpower needs.
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February 1, 1985
The effect of pay on the retention of Marine Corps aviators is studied. The estimated pay effects are then used to evaluate the potential impact of three recent proposals to adjust the structure of Aviation Career Incentive Pay (ACIP).
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December 1, 1984
An economic analyses conducted by CNA to evaluate policy options for meeting the Navy's growing manpower needs is described. The work was done in support of the Navy's Planning, Programming, and Budgeting process.
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August 1, 1983
This paper compares the career force projections of the PROPHET and the ACOL models to actual historical experience over the period FY78-FY80.
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March 1, 1982
This paper assesses the accuracy of the annualized cost of leaving model in projecting the size and composition of the military enlisted force over the period FY 78-FY 80.
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October 1, 1981
Four major models for predicting the effects of changes in military pay on retention are described and compared. The most sophisticated model called the Stochastic Cost of Leaving or SCOL model, is simulated to demonstrate the effects of several changes in military compensation on retention.
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January 1, 1981
The virtues and criticisms of the current military retirement system are described. Then an economic model is developed for analyzing the effects of different retirement systems on retention. The model also can be used to analyze other kinds of changes to the military compensation system. Here it is used to estimate the effects of three retirement plans on enlisted retention and force structure: (1) a two-tier plan that reduces annuities after 20 years of service, (2) a trust fund plan recommended by the President's Commission on Military Compensation that provides some benefits after 10 years but fewer after 20 years, and (3) a two-tier plan recommended by the Secretary of Defense that allows early withdrawal of prospective 20-year benefits after 10 years of service.
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