Research for 1970

U.S. defense officials have often said that the Soviet Union expects Western Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW) forces to attack its Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBNs) and thus is prepared to defend them in war. These Soviet expectations may have been encouraged by U.S. declaratory policy on the subject--that is, the totality of official and other authoritative statements on strategic doctrine and policy, ASW technology and programs from which Soviet observers reach conclusions about U.S. intentions. This paper reviews U.S. declaratory policy between 1970 and 1985 to determine specifically what that policy has been and then to infer what it has probably meant to the Soviets. It concludes that throughout this period official U.S. declaratory policy has implied an intent to engage in strategic ASW and that the Soviets have had strong reasons to believe that their SSBNs have been and will continue to be targets of U.S. ASW forces.

In accordance with a Vice Chief of Naval Operations directive, studies were carried out to meet the needs of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Manpower and Naval Reserve) in describing study programs needed to support manpower management functions, clarify the effects of factors related to the retention of officers and enlisted men, estimate the cost and effectiveness of proposed programs for alleviating critical shortages, predict retention rates, and develop screening criteria for selection and training of men who are likely to choose a Navy career. The findings are summarized in this paper in terms of their applicability to manpower management functions of planning, recruiting and selection, classification and training, utilization, and retention. See also 80 001301, 80 001302, 80 001303, 80 001304, 80 001305, 80 001306, 80 001307, 80 001308, and 80 001309.