U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan-Pakistan: Chinese Views and Interests

CNA China Studies -- On March 27, 2009, the United States unveiled a new strategy for Afghanistan based on three premises: that Afghanistan’s situation was “inextricably linked” to that of Pakistan; that efforts must include not only military operations but economic and capacity-building assistance as well; and that the situation in Afghanistan/Pakistan was an international security challenge requiring a multinational response from principal stakeholders.

Since then, U.S. military and interagency officials have continued publicly to probe China to see what Beijing would be willing to do to support that strategy and the U.S./NATO effort. The issues U.S. and NATO officials have discussed with China include providing targeted aid and reconstruction; opening the Afghan-China border to U.S./NATO forces for supply lines; and potentially providing troops in non-combat (or even combat) positions.

For the most part, China’s response has been to politely decline these opportunities or to take them under advisement with no apparent decision timetable in mind. Yet Beijing is thought to have both sufficient concern and sufficient capacity to be a more active contributor to the stability and development of these two countries, which lie along its southwestern border of Xinjiang Province. This report addresses what the Chinese have done to support the strategy, what they may be persuaded to do, and what they appear unlikely to do. A review and analysis of pertinent statements by key Chinese analysts and of actions by Chinese government officials since March 2009 reveal the key findings presented below.