What's Happening Between the Koreas?

February 17, 2011

A CNA expert talks about the provocations and problems brewing between North and South Korea. In this interview, RADM Michael McDevitt, USN, (Ret.) gives you a glimpse of the history and horror between these two countries. McDevitt is vice president and director of CNA Strategic Studies, a division of CNA's Center for Naval Analyses he helped to launch.  You can also read the entire interview below.

What’s Happening Between the Koreas?
An Interview with the Director for CNA’s Center for Strategic Studies,
RADM Michael McDevitt, USN, (Ret.)
 
 
When Harry “Met” Kim
 
“First of all, the United States has been in Korea since 1950, when President Harry Truman sent the U.S. in to respond to a North Korean invasion. It was an attempt to reunify the Korean Peninsula under the communist regime in the north. Since the Korean Armistice in ’53, the United States has had a military presence in the country to deter another North Korean invasion and we remain there, some 60 years later. I’m sure President Truman never in his wildest dreams would’ve imagined that the U.S. would still be in a position to have to worry about deterring aggressive North Korean behavior 60 years after the fact.”
 
The War Isn’t Over?
 
“That’s correct. It’s an armistice regime. There was never a peace treaty. There is no peace treaty. That’s one of the issues on the table for the future, reaching some sort of a permanent peace treaty. But there is a U.N. Armistice Commission that meets at Panmunjom periodically that has North Korean representatives, South Korean representatives, U.S., and what have you. That’s all part and parcel of what’s been going on for the last six decades.”
 
So What’s Happening Now?
 
“The six-party talks that have been going on now for about six years, were an attempt by the Bush administration to bring all of the interested parties, the Russians, the Chinese, both Koreas, the Japanese and the United States, to the table to address the issue of North Korea’s building of nuclear weapons. The concept was that the other five parties collectively would bring enough pressure to bear and provide the potential for incentives and negotiate an end to the North Korean nuclear weapons program. Those have failed. Subsequently, the North Koreans have tested nuclear weapons twice and the talks have essentially reached a dead end. There is the possibility that would resume, but the Obama Administration has correctly said, without returning to the agreed principles that the North Koreans agreed to in September of ’05, that their goal is the de-nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, we’re not going to start talking. The North Koreans have said, ‘Hey, now that we’ve tested nuclear weapons,we’re a nuclear weapons state. We want to be treated like India and Pakistan. Why should I give them up?’ And so that’s where we are right now.
 
Less Talk, More Provocation
 
“In addition to the nuclear issue, the other part that has come to the fore again in 2010 are North Korean provocative actions and the use of conventional military force. In 2010, they sunk a South Korean corvette patrolling in the water areas along the DMZ, obviously in the maritime space, sunk the Korean corvette Cheonan and killed 46 South Korean sailors. In fact, I had the chance to see the wreckage of the Cheonan. They raised it, salvaged it, put it up on blocks at [Republic of Korea] Second Fleet and it’s quite remarkable.
            “Then, this past November, they shelled an island again in this disputed territory that South Korea occupies, killing two South Korean Marines who were on the island -- there’s a military base there -- as well as two civilians because there is a civilian village there.
            “These kinds of activities have been typical of what the North Koreans have done over many, many decades. If you recall, back in 1967, they boarded and captured the surveillance ship, the USS Pueblo that was operating in international waters. In fact, they still have the Pueblo in one of their harbors. They released the crew after some years. They’ve blown up South Korean airliners. They’ve shot down U.S. airplanes, surveillance airplanes operating in international air space. They’ve attacked and killed U.S. soldiers in the demilitarized zone who were reacting to their efforts to chop down a tree. The U.S. soldiers went out to talk to them to see what was going on and they used axes to kill two American officers. And any innumerable ?? against the South Koreans over the years, like blowing up a good portion of the South Korean cabinet with a bomb in Rangoon. They tried to assassinate the [South Korean] president and accidentally killed his wife instead.
 
Dangerously Risky Business
 
“People say, ‘Why do they keep doing these things?’ And, of course, nobody knows for sure, but one thing that it has done is that it’s created the impression in the minds of the leadership in South Korea and the United States that the leadership in Pyongyang has a very high tolerance for risk. In other words, they’re willing to take chances; doing all of these things and run the risk of retaliatory action by the alliance that could lead to war. They’ve been willing to do that. Not only have they been willing to do that, the alliance has never responded. You might say, ‘Why? Why haven’t they responded?’ Well, the reason is both the South Korean government and the United States is worried that it could trigger escalation and lead to another Korean War. So, in effect, the alliance has been deterred from responding to these provocative acts for fear that would unleash a tit-for-tat response that could escalate into war.
            “Therefore, the U.S., while it deters another North Korean invasion, the alliance (the South Koreans and the United States) have been deterred by the impression we have of the leadership in Pyongyang that they’re willing to take risks, that they have a high tolerance for risk. We have been deterred for fear that it would lead to another war. On top of that, the capitol of South Korea, Seoul, is only less than 20 miles south of the DMZ. It’s within artillery and rocket range of North Korean batteries. Without actually trying to attack, in other words mobilizing an army and marching across the border, they can shell Seoul. They’ve threatened over the years to turn Seoul into a Sea of Fire. This demonstration where they hit the island, YeonPyeong, and killed the two Marines and the two civilians, was just a demonstration for the first time of how they could do that. And so the combination of these factors have made the alliance very risk averse because we don’t know for sure what they’re likely to do in response to a retaliation.”
 
No More Mister Nice Guy,
But is it the Right Move?
 
            “So, I would say, for the last 50 odd years that these provocative acts have taken place, we’ve essentially had a policy of turning the other cheek. That is just beginning to change. The current president of South Korea, Lee Myung-Bak, was under considerable political pressure, first with the sinking of the Cheonan and then the shelling last year, to be more forceful in his response.
“So he has changed South Korea’s posture to what he calls ‘pro-active deterrents.’ Which means, he’s saying, we’ve been too passive over all these years. We need to react and we will do a tit-for-tat. And he’s indicated in a speech to the country that we have to be willing to accept more risk than we’ve ever been willing to accept before.
“In my opinion, this is an incredibly courageous policy on their part, because there is a possibility of war. But because there is a possibility of war, it’s also a very dangerous policy.”
“Look at how successful South Korea has been over the last 50 years. They have something like the 13th largest economy in the world. Their trade is booming. Their economy is booming. South Korean businesses and industries are amongst the leaders in many areas around the world. So you say to yourself, maybe turning the other cheek and accepting periodic North Korean provocations, but, thereby, avoiding war has turned out to be a better strategy than responding because it makes you mad to sit there and have to take these provocative acts and not do anything. So we shall see if North Korea does something else, and I suspect that they might, how South Korea responds and if they do respond, will North Korea respond to that response? And then will South Korea respond to that response? And so will we get in this cycle, as I said, of tit-for-tat, or action reaction? And who’s going to blink first? Who’s going to stop first? This becomes an issue of face. There’s a lot of uncertainty now going forward. While on the one hand this proactive deterrent posture makes everybody feel better and it assuages political concerns domestically in South Korea. When the passions of the moment calm down a little bit, it’ll be interesting to see if the South Koreans say, ‘Well, wait a minute. Do we really want to risk having Seoul shelled, or getting into one of these exchanges with the North Koreans? Because we think the North Koreans have a higher tolerance for risk than we do.’ I think they do. At least, their history has shown they do.”
 
Dear Leader, Young General, Big Problem
 
            “The final complicating point is North Korea’s in the process of political transition. Kim Jong-il, the second leader of North Korea, has had a stroke. He’s about 68 or 69 years old and people are not clear about the state of his health. So, he, just last year, picked his youngest son, Kim Jong-un, to be his designated successor. And he’s promoted him to 4-star general. He’s a 29-year-old 4-star general. And there is a succession process going on in North Korea in which, the Young General, as he’s known, has to, slowly but surely, be deemed as a credible successor to his father. And one of the ways that he builds credibility is if he is seen as being involved or in the planning. For example, the planning in the sinking of the South Korea ship, or in the planning of the artillery attacks. How I characterize it is does he have his fingerprints on those activities, building up his resume as it were as a tough, resourceful leader, willing to take military action to defend the North Korean state. So, if these provocative acts in the future are tied up with the succession process and the young general has his fingerprints on these acts, it would be very difficult for North Korea to back off then, because that will undercut credibility and have an impact on succession politics in Pyongyang. So that adds a degree of complication and danger, I think, to the whole process.”