What Went Right in Iraq

Dr. Jonathan Schroden

As violence has subsided in Iraq and attention swings towards other irregular conflicts, there is significant interest in identifying best practices and lessons learned in Iraq and how those can be applied elsewhere. As a CNA field representative with experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, I was recently asked to think critically about "What Went Right" in Iraq the past few years and how those lessons might translate to Afghanistan. ¹

Currently, there are a number of popular schools of thought on what caused the turnaround in Iraq. One of these, which is perhaps best articulated by Bing West in his book, The Strongest Tribe, centers on the combination of overwhelming U.S. combat power and a shift in local attitudes that started in Al Anbar province. A second, which is perhaps best described in Linda Robinson's book, Tell Me How This Ends, focuses on the combination of General David Petraeus—particularly his skills and personality—and the surge in U.S. forces as the key elements of the turnaround.

As is often the case with popular opinions, these schools of thought can be viewed as left- and right-lateral limits of a range of truths, and as generalizations miss several important points in the middle. Based on my experience in Iraq and analyses of events there, I have identified four critical factors that led to the turnaround in Iraq.

The ability of U.S. forces to learn and adapt, combined with overwhelming combat power

In a December 2008 interview with a tactical commander on success in Iraq, our discussion turned to the ability of the United States to bring persistent, overwhelming firepower to bear on its enemies. While some might interpret this in conventional terms of planes and tanks, it is just as relevant in terms of individual Marines and soldiers standing post on street corners and conducting patrols in urban environments. As the commander made clear to me, over time, some elements of the insurgency simply got tired of getting killed, and this helped drive them to the negotiating table.

In addition, over the past several years, U.S. forces in Iraq have repeatedly and rapidly adjusted their tactics to what has worked on the ground. As Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) John Nagl, now president of the Center for a New American Security, argues in his book, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, the inability of the U.S. military to learn and adapt was a key contributor to the loss of the Vietnam War. This has not been the case in Iraq, where the past few years have seen the rapid fielding of new technologies and steady increases in the speed of feedback loops such as: 

• Operations -> fresh intelligence -> follow-on operations; and,
• Operations -> lessons learned -> revised tactics and training -> improved operations.

The creativity of units on the ground has also been impressive. Many specific examples of this are classified, but overall, units have exhibited great ingenuity in the ways they have engaged the populace, both overtly and covertly. It is this combination of persistent, overwhelming combat power and a learning, adapting, creative culture that has made the U.S. military a formidable enemy to insurgents in Iraq.

A shift from "Generals know best" to "What's working, Captain?"

A number of studies that have focused on lessons learned in Iraq in recent years have identified as a best practice the notion of "pushing assets down" or empowering efforts at the lowest levels. This idea runs contrary to much of conventional military thinking, and it requires not only the ability to learn and adapt, but also a lack of hubris from military leaders. In particular, the notion that captains, lieutenants, and non-commissioned officers may have a better sense than generals of what works can be a tough one for generals to swallow.

One particular example of this was tribal engagement in Iraq and the idea that not all insurgents were "irreconcilable." There are instances throughout the war of tribal leaders coming forward to seek help against al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), and decisions by senior officials to turn them away. The shift from an attitude that said "tribes have no place in a modern Iraq" to one that embraced them as an integral part of Iraqi society and as a source of manpower and intelligence came from the bottom up. This shift was embraced by General Petraeus and was a key factor for success in Iraq.

The populace got a necessary taste of al-Qaeda

As the security situation worsened in Iraq from 2004-2006, AQI gained control over some areas and was able to institute its brand of Shari’a law. In these cases, it became painfully clear to the locals what life would be like with AQI in charge. Beratings, beatings, and beheadings for things as seemingly trivial as smoking in public or using the internet did not resonate, nor did the thought of a lifestyle reminiscent of the 7th century. Furthermore, the idea that Muslims who call themselves holy and pious would kill other Muslims for these and other "offenses" rang hollow with Iraqis. The realization by Iraqis that AQI brought only "sticks" and never "carrots" was a key factor for the shift in local attitudes that was so important to the turnaround in Iraq.

Clarification of strategic focus with concurrent shifts in tactics

In his book, Bing West makes the excellent point that early in the Iraq war, the United States was conflicted in its goals. President Bush was talking about establishing a democracy in Iraq as a means of transforming the Middle East, which might logically translate to a long-term presence. Yet militarily, the United States was trying to turn things over to the Iraqis and leave as quickly as possible. The announcement of the surge in 2007 brought not only additional forces, but also a necessary clarification of U.S. strategy.

Just as important, with the surge in forces came a shift in tactical approach, to a focus on what most counterinsurgency standards would define as the most critical factor: the provision of security to the populace. The shift from ever-larger bases and "commuting to work" to smaller, U.S.-Iraqi Joint Security Stations that were dispersed amongst the population had proven successful in Tal Afar and Al Anbar and was adapted to Baghdad and elsewhere. "Clear, Hold, Build" proved a much more effective operational construct than repeated sweeps of the same areas. And the Marines' mantras of "First, Do No Harm" and "No Better Friend, No Worse Enemy" summed up succinctly the mindset needed to effectively engage both the population and the enemy.

What can we leverage from our experience in Iraq to help in Afghanistan?

While there are some similarities, Afghanistan is not Iraq. In particular, the insurgencies in each country are unique and require tailored approaches to counter them. That said, given recent successes in Iraq, it is still worth selectively applying the lessons learned there to improve efforts elsewhere. Combining the above lessons for Iraq with my experiences and CNA analyses, below are five critical areas on which we should focus in Afghanistan. It is important to point out that these are areas in which we (US and NATO forces, and government and nongovernmental civilians) can improve. The Afghans have areas in which they need to improve as well, most notably in reducing government corruption.

1. We need to provide better security. The Afghan people had a taste of Taliban rule and don't want them back. But they can't help us if we don't provide security. We need to get off the big bases and operate amongst the populace. We need more U.S. and NATO forces to hold areas that have been cleared. We need to accelerate the development of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), especially the police. And until the ANSF can fully secure the country, we need a capability to bridge the gap. While simply applying the Sons of Iraq program to Afghanistan is not the answer, that program can serve as a template for an interim capability.
2. We need to stop killing civilians. Our heavy reliance on air power, with its associated collateral damage, is a critical vulnerability of our strategy. We must recall the "First, Do No Harm" mantra that worked so well in Iraq. And in the unfortunate event that we do cause civilian casualties, we need to better strive to be "first with the truth" to local audiences. If we conduct an operation and the enemy quickly claims that we killed 60 civilians, it doesn't matter what our days-later investigation says—the court of public opinion has an impatient jury.
3. We need better unity of effort both amongst, and between, military forces and civilians in Afghanistan. In Iraq, we strove to achieve unity of effort between the military and civilian sides, and some have cited that as a key factor for success. In Afghanistan, we have unity of effort for neither the military nor the civilian side. These disunities create exploitable seams for our enemy.
4. We need better metrics for determining progress, as well as better collection, standardization, and analysis of data. In Iraq, we have teams of operations analysts at many levels collecting and analyzing data in ever-creative ways. These analyses help us learn and adapt, support better decision-making, and provide evidence of progress to domestic audiences. We need these for Afghanistan as well.
5. Finally, we need a greater sense of urgency in Afghanistan. Our goals as stated will take years to achieve, and we cannot disregard the impact of years of fighting in Iraq and increasing violence in Afghanistan on our civil and military stamina. The timelines for achievements in Afghanistan are growing ever shorter, and we need to determine if we can, and are willing, to meet them.

Jonathan Schroden is a CNA analyst who has been deployed with U.S. military troops in Iraq and Afghanistan.

¹ This paper is presented as an unclassified version of the original, which contains more detail at the Secret level.