Iranian Negotiating Strategies

April 19, 2006

A Roundtable Organized by the Foreign Leadership Studies Program in the Center for Strategic Studies

Michael Connell

In April 2006, the Foreign Leadership Studies Program, part of The CNA Corporation's Center for Strategic Studies, convened a roundtable on Iranian negotiating strategies.

The discussion focused on factors motivating Iranian negotiators, including cultural, ideological, and historical influences; tactics and techniques employed by the Iranians; and the strengths, idiosyncrasies, and vulnerabilities associated with those techniques. It also examined Iran's strategic interests and the geopolitical factors that might affect the progress of future negotiations with Iran.

Panelists included two European diplomats recently posted to Tehran, two former U.S. diplomats stationed in Iran before the revolution, and a Middle Eastern scholar with a background in Iranian negotiating behavior and tactics. Their remarks were not for attribution. What follows is a synopsis of observations raised by these regional experts.

Introduction

The controversy over Iran's nuclear program, its role as a state sponsor of terrorism, and the election of hardliner Mahmoud Ahmadinejad have once again thrust Iran onto the world stage. Following the failure of the last round of negotiations between Iran and the EU3, and the International Atomic Energy Agency's referral of Iran to the U.N. Security Council, policymakers have considered various options for dealing with Iran, including a diplomatic solution based on a carrot-and-stick approach, economic sanctions, and even kinetic military strikes.

One option—the idea of direct negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program—has received renewed interest following Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's May 31 announcement that "the United States will come to the table with our EU3 colleagues and meet with Iran's representatives," with the proviso that Iran halt its uranium enrichment activities.

The Influence of History, Nationalism, and Culture on the Iranian Worldview

All of the panelists agreed that Iranian perceptions of the world, and therefore of their own security, are colored by their unique culture, their history, and their sense of national identity. Iranians believe that they have inherited the mantle of an ancient civilization, one which, by virtue of its history and achievements, deserves to play a prominent role in the Middle East and beyond. Iran is one of the largest countries in that region, both in terms of size and population. Their strong sense of national identity, coupled with their Shiite faith, causes Iranians to look at their neighbors with a certain degree of disdain. According to one of the panelists, this tendency can be seen when Iranians adopt a "who are you to speak to us" attitude in their negotiations with Arabs. Regional instability has only bolstered this tendency, according to another speaker. Iranians are acutely aware of the unrest on their borders. They have witnessed the collapse of the Soviet Union on their northern border, unrest in the Caucasus, and chaos in Iraq and Afghanistan. In contrast, Iranians tend to perceive their own country as an island of stability in a region awash in conflict.

One panelist referred to a dissonance between Iranian national pride and their historic experience with national humiliation at the hands of the British, the Russians, and the Americans. To a certain extent, the animosity for all things Western during the Iranian revolution stemmed from the merging of nationalist tendencies with the belief that Iran had been humiliated over the last two centuries, as evidenced by the regime's current rhetoric over the nuclear question. As President Ahmadinejad has repeatedly asserted, when Iran joins the nuclear club, the West will have to "treat us the way we deserve."

Negotiating in Iranian Culture

Most of the Western diplomats stationed in Tehran have described their experience of negotiating with Iranians with adjectives such as "excruciating" or "painful." However, there was a consensus among the panelists that Iranian behavior in this regard is not indicative of only the post-revolutionary period. Rather, the Iranian style of negotiation is deeply rooted in Persian history and culture. Simply put, it is how they have always done business. In support of this argument, one speaker pointed to the example of Sir John Malcolm, the first official British envoy to Tehran. When he landed at Bushehr in 1800, he spent over four months in the port negotiating the terms of the protocol under which he would be received in Tehran. More than two centuries later, the context has changed, but the Iranian negotiating style has not.

One panelist suggested that there is a deep cultural disposition among Persians to keep all their options open as long as possible. According to him, "Nothing in a Persian negotiation is finally done and dusted. Whenever I used to talk to businessmen who were in Iran, they always said the same thing, which is when you're negotiating in Iran, the ink is never dry on the contract, and there is always something which can be unpicked."

In support of this point, the speaker cited a conversation he had with a number of World Bank economists who were visiting Iran. "They couldn't work out for the life of them why countries right across the Gulf were buying their fruit from South America rather than importing it from next door in Iran, a country that produces fabulous fruit, of very high quality, and in very large quantities...They finally thought they'd got the answer when they found some fruit dealer from the Emirates, who put it like this: ‘When I negotiate with Chile, for example, we have a tough negotiation, and we agree [on] a price. I can then be sure that I'll have regular deliveries at that price. If I negotiate with an Iranian businessman, then we'll have a tough negotiation, I'll get one delivery, then there will be another tough negotiation for the next delivery and then so on every time I want a delivery.'"

Where the speakers disagreed was on the Iranian capacity to be pragmatic. One speaker likened negotiating with the Iranians to buying a rug from an Iranian carpet salesman. "You go in, you drink plenty of tea, but at the end of the day, both sides will make compromises," and a sale will be made. Another speaker contradicted this line of thought, claiming that in his experience, the Iranians do not understand the concept of a win-win situation. According to him, "If one guy is smiling at the end of it, then the other guy has not done well enough."

Who is Ahmadinejad and What Does he Represent?

The election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as president of the Islamic Republic in 2005 has dramatically altered the state of affairs in Iranian politics. Under Mohammad Khatami (president from 1997-2005), the president played almost no role in any of the areas related to national security. The Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), which is under the control of the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, had the portfolio for all negotiations related to Iran's nuclear program. There could be no progress on any issue without Khamenei's consent. While this is still largely the case, the new president has played a more prominent role in national security and foreign policy. In part, this is because Ahmadinejad, unlike his predecessor, is backed by certain powerful and radical factions within the Iranian government, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the portion of the Iranian military tasked with safeguarding the values and interests of the revolution. It is widely assumed that the IRGC decided to run Ahmadinejad as their candidate in order to increase their influence within the regime.

Although outwardly loyal to the Supreme Leader, Ahmadinejad is a follower of Ayatollah Mesbah-Yazdi, a radical cleric who took the unusual step (for Shiite jurisprudents) of declaring his support for the acquisition and use of nuclear weapons. Ahmadinejad's rhetoric, therefore, tends to reflect the radical views of his mentor. In this regard, his public statements regarding Israel, Iran's security, and the United States are more confrontational and prone to brinksmanship over the nuclear issue. According to one panelist, Ahmadinejad is in effect saying to his constituents, "Look what we're doing to these foreigners who are trying to control us. We are asserting ourselves."

Iran's Strategic Interests

The regime in Tehran believes that the United States and its allies seek to destroy it and marginalize Iran. One panelist said it is for this reason that Iran is highly unlikely to accept some kind of security assurance from the United States to forgo its nuclear program. The Iranians saw what happened in Iraq and concluded that even a country that has chemical or biological weapons would be incapable of deterring the United States from attacking it if the United States was determined to do so. Only a robust nuclear deterrent capability would succeed in this regard. Furthermore, the rhetoric surrounding the so-called "axis of evil" has made the Iranian leadership highly skeptical of U.S. long-term intentions in the region. So under Ahmadinejad, there has been a shift from relying on international legitimacy (the hallmark of Khatami's presidency) to a policy based on confrontation and deterrence. The Iranians even appear to be unwilling to adopt what one panelist referred to as the "Israeli model" of nuclear ambiguity (i.e., no declared capability). Rather, their strategy appears to be aimed at early testing of a nuclear device, after which they will engage in negotiations.

Iranian Negotiating Tactics

During the course of the roundtable, panelists referred to a number of tactics, techniques, and procedures that Iranian government officials tend to use while negotiating. Western diplomats, especially those who are newly assigned to Tehran, are often caught off-guard by what one speaker referred to as the "very tactical negotiating style" of their Iranian counterparts. The following represents a summary of some of the more common techniques employed by Iranian negotiators.

Prolong Negotiations

Several of the speakers said Iranians have an amazing capacity to prolong negotiations. In this regard, they are good at exploiting the willingness of people to accept process instead of substance. For example, Iranians may create a virtual issue, begin negotiating, and then create a scenario in which everyone is talking about something that was not on the original agenda, thereby stalling the negotiations.

Iranians also tend to insist on a multi-stage negotiating process as a way to stall negotiations. For instance, Iranians will negotiate the terms of a contract and then will insist on negotiating the implementation of those terms. That way, they can expect a concession at each step in the negotiations while at the same time wearing down their opponents.

Use Guilt

According to one panelist, Iranians will make extensive use of guilt as a negotiating technique. No matter what he or his fellow diplomats had delivered for the Iranians, "it was never enough." He went on to explain that the Iranians "will assiduously note and bring up repeatedly every moment when we failed to deliver something which they expected us to deliver. They are very good at noting every point to their credit and every point to our discredit."

Never Show Gratitude

Whether as a tactic or a matter of principle, Iranian officials will rarely show gratitude when conferring with Western diplomats, despite a strong cultural penchant for ritualized politeness (referred to as ta'arof in Persian). One of the speakers said that he had never received a "thank you" or a "that's fabulous" from any Iranian officials while he was serving as a diplomat in Tehran. As an example, he mentioned the recent EU3 negotiations with Iran, during which Iranian officials stated that the good faith of the Europeans would be measured by Iran's success in applying for WTO membership. After Condoleezza Rice announced, in the context of the negotiations, that the United States was prepared to lift its objections to Iran joining the WTO, the speaker visited the Iranian Supreme National Security Council the following day and had expected at least a "nod of gratitude." Instead, his Iranian counterpart told him that they never really wanted to join the WTO, and besides, "If we did want it, it was our right, so you don't get any points for delivering to us what should be ours by right anyway."

Twist Logic

A third technique used by Iranian negotiators and one noted by several panelists is their "amazing ability to turn any argument around" in order to undercut the arguments of their opponents. One of the panelists cited the case of the Canadian journalist Zahra Kazemi, who was killed while in detention in Iran in 2003. According to him, the Iranians "very cleverly found an example, at about the same time, of when a Canadian policeman, in self defense, had killed an Iranian. So when the Canadians came in and said ‘you have grossly abused the human rights and illegally killed one of our nationals' the response was ‘well, you did exactly the same to one of ours and it's actually your crime that is more heinous.'"

Play up Your Own Differences

Iranian officials will often play up the differences between the various factions in their own government in order to elicit concessions from foreign diplomats. For instance, when Ali Larijani, the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, was negotiating with Mohamed ElBaradei, the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, one of the speakers said that Larijani would say "Look, I'd really like to help you. I'd really like a solution but it's these hardliners who are making it difficult. If only you could give me this or that concession, we'll be able to do a deal and I'll be able to get the better of the hardliners." ElBaradei emerged from that meeting thinking that Larijani is a moderate, when actually he is one of the conservative hardliners.

Play up the Differences of Your Opponents

This technique is very similar to the previous technique, except in reverse. In addition to playing up their own differences, Iranians are extremely good at playing up the differences between the United States and its allies. One way they do this is by trying to buy a country's vote. In other words, they will offer lucrative economic opportunities to a given country while at the same time threatening that the country might lose access to the Iranian market should it side with the United States. For this reason, said one of the speakers, it is very important that the Europeans and the United States present a united front on the nuclear issue.

Connect the Unconnected

Another Iranian negotiating strategy is to try to connect things which, to an outside observer, might appear to be completely unconnected. As an example, one of the speakers reported that the Iranian Foreign Ministry contacted his embassy regarding possible threats to the embassy from certain elements inside Iran. The Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs wanted the embassy to improve its security posture. In line with the Iranian request, the embassy put in a planning application for a new gatehouse. However, the Iranians said that they would only consider the application if the foreign embassy would sort out an issue that the Iranian ambassador was having in the host nation's capital with his landlord over access to the alleyway behind his house. For the Iranians, the issue was seen as a quid pro quo, even though the two issues were, in fact, completely unrelated.

Ignore Previous Agreements

Sometimes, the Iranians will ignore agreements that they have already made. One panelist mentioned that over the course of his diplomatic assignment in Tehran, he lost track of the number of times in which he came to an agreement with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs only to have the substance of it entirely ignored. The speaker referred to this tactic as "a fairly crude negotiating technique."

Stress Reciprocity

According to one panelist, Iranian officials will stress reciprocity in their dealings with Western diplomats, but only when it suits them. For example, if their ambassador in a European capital did not get in to see a minister, the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs will make sure the same country's ambassador in Tehran does not get in to see an Iranian minister. The same does not apply in reverse, however. If a foreign country gives an Iranian ambassador access to their ministers, then, according to the speaker, "there's absolutely no way that we can use that as leverage to get our charge d'affaires immediate access in the other direction."

The same does not apply in reverse, however. If a foreign country gives an Iranian ambassador access to their ministers, then, according to the speaker, "there's absolutely no way that we can use that as leverage to get our charge d'affaires immediate access in the other direction."

Know Your Adversary

The Iranians tend to make extensive use of operational intelligence. They will learn a great deal about the people they are negotiating with, including where they come from, what their families are like, and what sorts of positions they have held in the past. In part, this reflects a tendency on the part of Iranians to assume and overlap between personal and professional ties.

Foibles and Fallibilities of Iranian Negotiators

Some of the speakers challenged the belief that the Iranians are always "fabulous strategists and brilliant negotiators." Referring to the mystique that has developed around Persian negotiating tactics, one panelist said that Iranians "are very clever negotiators, but they are by no means always the better negotiators." For instance, Iranian negotiators will often care much more about coming out on top than about the substance of the negotiations. This is evident in the petroleum sector, for example, where the Iranian regime badly needs foreign investment and yet it cannot expedite its negotiations with European oil and gas companies because, according to one of the speakers, "it's so determined to screw them over." Typically, for instance, the Iranian Ministry of Oil will change the terms of a contract with a foreign oil company after all the details have already been decided. Inevitably, the oil companies end up canceling the contract. According to the panelist, the Iranian negotiators may be "delighted at their cunning ability to pull a fast one at the last minute, but the net result of this sort of game-playing over a period of years is that the Iranian oil and gas economy is woefully behind where it should be."

Iranians also tend to be better tacticians than strategists. In the opinion of one speaker, Iranian negotiators are usually better at "playing backgammon than chess." In other words, they tend to play the best move but they do not think several moves ahead. It would be a mistake, for instance, to automatically assume that they have some elaborate negotiating strategy worked out that will lead them to where they have predicted in four or five moves. Sometimes, according to the panelist, "they just play the board as they see it."

Another speaker raised the example of the Iran-Iraq war. By April 1982, Iraqi forces had been repelled from Iranian territory, Iranian troops had entered Iraq, and Iran had actually won the war. Iran did not seek to build on this tremendous advantage by obtaining a negotiated peace on its own terms. Iranian leaders instead repeated the same demands they had sought since the first day of the Iraqi aggression—the designation of Iraq as the aggressor, substantive war reparations, and above all, the removal of Saddam Hussein.

Obviously, the Iraqi leader could not accept all of these demands, especially the third one, so in spite of all the efforts that were made by the United Nations Secretary-General, there were no negotiations. The war went on, and by 1988, Iran had squandered all of its advantages and was forced to sue for peace on lesser terms than it could have obtained in 1982.

Complicating Factors in Any Negotiations with Iran

One factor that will potentially complicate any negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program is rooted in the nature of the regime itself. Described by one of the speakers as a "galaxy" of competing factions, rather than a hierarchy along the lines of the former Soviet Union, nothing tends to happen in Iran unless all of the factions can agree on a given point. In such a system, it becomes very easy to veto policy initiatives. No individual or group is likely to suggest a compromise in negotiations, especially over sensitive issues of national security, because their rivals might accuse them of treason. Iranian diplomats, therefore, have little room for maneuver, and are unlikely to display any initiative when it comes to negotiating with their counterparts.

Another factor is the current price of oil. Increased revenues in this sector have benefited the regime in Tehran, which can now afford things that it could not have before. This has led the Iranian government to conclude that it is immune to pressure, and that its opponents are vulnerable. This fact is bound to have an impact on negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program.

Potential Role of an Intermediary in Negotiations

If the United States wished to engage with the Iranians directly, how would it do so? One of the panelists suggested that as a first step, both sides might rely on a mutually trusted third country to mediate. He pointed out that when Iranians have a disagreement at the individual level, and their dispute escalates to a point at which they are shouting curses at each other, an interlocutor is usually found who will attempt to bridge the gap between the two sides. At a macro level, the speaker suggested that this technique would also be applicable to the dispute between the United States and Iran over the latter's nuclear program. There is also a historical precedent for relying on the services of an intermediary. During the hostage crisis, the Algerians acted as go-betweens for the United States and Iranian governments.

What if Iran Develops the Bomb? What Then?

In response to a question posed by one of the audience members regarding the possibility of negotiating with Iran after they have already developed and tested a nuclear bomb, one panelist said that at that stage, negotiations would depend on who is in power in Tehran. Obviously, the United States and its allies would prefer a moderate regime. However, the current composition of the government in Iran suggests that the regime would adopt a more belligerent stance if it had nuclear weapons. For instance, the perception of the security afforded them by a nuclear deterrent capability would probably encourage the regime to believe they can have a freer hand when it comes to engaging in acts of terrorism. According to the speaker, the Iranians are generally pragmatic. However, he qualified this assumption by saying that the current government in Iran, which tends to favor apocalyptic rhetoric over pragmatism, is not typically Iranian.

Conclusion

There was a general consensus that Iranians are shrewd negotiators, at least in a tactical sense. They employ various strategies, ranging from dividing their opponents to prolonging negotiations, which have the cumulative effect of disorienting and frustrating those with whom they are negotiating. While none of the techniques discussed during the roundtable could be described as uniquely Iranian, the manner and the skill with which they are employed tends to distinguish Iranian diplomats from their counterparts in other nations.

The speakers also tended to agree that Iranians have a deep-rooted cultural affinity for the give and take (lit. dad-o-setad) of negotiating. The tactics employed by Iranian diplomats, which are often ascribed to revolutionary fervor and ideological intransigence, were actually utilized long before the 1979 revolution. They stem from a variety of cultural and historical factors, including a strong sense of Iranian national identity and a belief that Iran is entitled to play a larger role on the world stage.

Where panelists seemed to differ was on the prospect for negotiations between the United States and Iran. Some panelists appeared to hold out hope for a negotiated settlement with Iran over the nuclear issue. Pointing to a history of "missed opportunities" during the early years of the revolution, they suggested that if the current administration forgoes its stated objective of regime-change in Tehran, it might help remove the barrier of trust that exists between the United States and the Islamic Republic. Other panelists assessed the prospect of negotiations in a more negative light. They pointed to the EU3's efforts in this regard, which were, in retrospect, a total failure. They also noted the numerous obstacles to negotiations, including President Ahmadinejad's radical, almost millenarian tendencies, rising oil prices, and a factionalized government in Tehran that is practically incapable of making major policy overtures unless everyone can agree on a stated policy. According to one of the panelists, Iran's national security establishment watched events as they unfolded in Iraq and concluded, rightly or wrongly, that only by having nuclear weapons would it be capable of deterring U.S. "aggression."