The study examines the manpower system for unrestricted officers, documenting the degree to which officer inventories did not match requirements and identifying options for addressing shortfalls. The authors examine the FY92-FY05 period to identify systematic shortages by primary military occupational specialty (PMOS) and analyze promotion rates by PMOS to see if promotion rates differ.
Despite high deployment tempo in FY05, the Marine Corps successfully met its FY05 enlisted reenlistment goals and the retention rate for officers was even higher than predicted. But as the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) continues, there is concern as to how increasing deployment time (DEPTEMPO) will affect Marines’ continuation in the Corps. This study statistically analyzes this issue.
The Department of Defense (DoD) is considering ways to increase voluntary participation in the Reserves. One such proposal, the Continuum of Service (CoS), recognizes that people differ in their willingness and ability to accept activation and deployment. DoD asked CNA researchers to examine potential changes to the compensation system that would support voluntary participation in a CoS. Researchers concluded that policy-makers can use compensation tools to effectively implement a CoS, but that across-the-board compensation changes would not encourage participation. They also found no evidence to support the idea that implementing a CoS, or increasing compensation to support a CoS, would significantly increase reserve retention. Researchers say a cost-effective CoS will rely on targeted compensation.
This study hopes to improve the Selected Reserve Incentive Program (SRIP) and to help the Marine Corps Reserve (MCR) to better understand Selected Reserve (SelRes) attrition. First, we document the legislative authorities for the payment of SelRes unit bonuses and bonus offerings across the Guard/Reserve components. Next, we document findings from focus groups held with Marines in the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). The study also describes recommended changes to the current SRIP that could help improve its ability to recruit and retain Marines in SMCR units. Finally, we present our analysis of SelRes attrition and the effect of SRIP bonuses on retention.
In this memorandum, we assess the extent to which major, existing compensation tools align with the Department of the Navy’s (DoN’s) goals and principles and recommend changes that would better align compensation with these goals. Our recommendations revolve around three themes. First, the current system is inflexible and does not maximize taxpayers’ return on investment. A better-aligned system would expand use of the DoN’s more flexible compensation tools. Second, the DoN does not have any tools that are explicitly designed to reward high performance. However, existing compensation tools could be modified to provide this linkage. Finally, the current system is heavily skewed toward deferred compensation such as retirement pay, retiree health care, and TRICARE for Life. The DoN should seek to remove this bias by supporting the repeal of recent enhancements to these programs or, at a minimum, by aggressively resisting any further increases. More generally, offering cafeteria-style health care and retirement benefits would improve flexibility and help maximize effectiveness.
In this research, we use Census data to examine how the pool of potential recruits has changed in the face of changing education requirements. Next, we examine how the performance of Sailors and Marines has changed in response to these requirements. We find that education requirements often have nuanced effects on the civilian population—helping some groups while harming others. Within the Navy and the Marine Corps, education requirements have had only muted effects to date. In general, attrition rates are not influenced by these policies, but some measures of quality (i.e., AFQT scores) are. Finally, we find that the growth of those holding alternate credentials in the Navy is not related to education requirements at all but instead is related to the recruiting environment.
This paper examines immigration’s effects on the recruitable-age population and the success of non-citizen service members in the military. We find that, controlling for other factors, 3-month attrition rates for non-citizens are 3.7 percentage points lower than for citizens. Similarly, 36-month attrition rates for non-citizen accessions are between 9 and 20 percentage points lower than those for white U.S. citizens.
The Marine Corps's manpower costs—about $9.4 billion—represent 60 percent of its annual budget. Before this study, there was no institutionalized and documented methodology for forecasting losses and no systematic attempt to improve existing techniques. Personnel charged with developing plans to meet Marine Corps endstrength requirements relied on information gleaned during overlap with their predecessors and sometimes developed their own methods, which were susceptible to errors. The study's authors revamped the process to make it more systematic and recommended ways to accurately forecast endstrength losses and gains.
CNA's Retirement Choice Calculator lets future military retirees determine how much they would earn under DoD's High-3 retirement plan, which bases retirement pay on the highest average basic pay for three years of a career, or under the REDUX plan, which provides a $30,000 upfront bonus with smaller retirement checks over time. (The differing plans affect service members who joined the military after July 31, 1986.) The calculator, developed as part of CNA's Retirement Choice study, allows service members to determine which plan would earn them the most money based on factors including their retirement age, years of service, and the rank at which they will retire. View Calculator